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480 abstract
This paper examines the application of the German Hartz-IV model in Austria. If 
the Hartz-IV reform were to be transferred to Austria, this would imply that instead 
of unemployment assistance (Notstandshilfe), the social-assistance-type minimum 
income benefit (Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung) would be follow-up assis-
tance after unemployment benefit expires. The analysis is carried out using the 
tax-benefit microsimulation models EUROMOD and SORESI based on the latest 
EU-SILC 2015 data for Austria. We simulate a baseline scenario according to the 
minimum income benefit regulations of the nine federal states for the year 2017 
and a scenario including a proxy for an asset check of capital income. In addition, 
following current political discussions and developments, we simulate a ceiling 
scenario, in which the sum of minimum standards per household is capped at EUR 
1,500 per month. The direct (monetary) effects of the potential reform are ana-
lysed on three levels: fiscal implications; number of receiving households includ-
ing socio-demographic characteristics; income distribution and risk of poverty.
Keywords: social assistance, public expenditure, household income, Austria, micro-
simulation
1 IntRoDUctIon
The report by the commission Modern Services on the Labour Market (chaired by 
Peter Hartz) from 2002 contains recommendations for reforms in labour market 
policy and placement service in Germany. At the same time, measures were devel-
oped to increase the incentives for job search for the (long-term) unemployed. The 
resulting legal regulations were implemented in 2003 (Hartz I and II), 2004 (Hartz 
III) and 2005 (Hartz IV).
Basically, Hartz IV combines the hitherto existing unemployment assistance 
(Arbeitslosenhilfe) and social assistance for persons capable of gainful employ-
ment into unemployment benefit II (Arbeitslosengeld II), a new basic security 
provision for jobseekers. Compared to the former unemployment assistance, a 
change from standard of living to basic security took place: the benefit amount is 
now based on a lump-sum assessment of needs and is independent of income from 
previous employment. Unemployment benefit II (like the previous unemployment 
assistance) is paid once the entitlement to the insurance-based unemployment 
benefit (I) has expired. The latter was left more or less unchanged after the reform.
Since its introduction in Germany, a transfer of the Hartz-IV reform has been a 
recurring topic of public and political debate in Austria. If the reform were to be 
transferred, this would imply that after the expiration of unemployment benefit 
(Arbeitslosengeld), instead of unemployment assistance (Notstandshilfe), a mini-
mum income benefit (Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung) would be the follow-up 
benefit. As was the case in Germany, unemployment assistance represents a means-
tested insurance benefit, whereas minimum income benefit is a social-assistance-
type benefit.
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481Some representatives from Austrian institutions like the Federal Ministry of 
Finances or the Chamber of Commerce argue that a regulation similar to Hartz IV 
would reduce social expenditure and contribute to unemployment reduction by 
increasing incentives for taking up employment, especially for the long-term 
unemployed (cf. e.g. Schmidt, 2016:2), while some other representatives from 
institutions like the Federal Ministry for Social Affairs and the Chamber of 
Labour point to the negative outcomes of the reform in terms of increased risk of 
poverty and the expansion of the low-pay sector as has happened in Germany 
(AK Wien, 2016).
Given the controversial political debate, the European Centre Vienna was con-
tracted by the Federal Austrian Ministry of Finance to analyse the direct monetary 
effects of a corresponding application of the German model to Austria by using 
tax-/benefit microsimulation models (EUROMOD and SORESI) based on the lat-
est EU-SILC 2015 micro-data from Statistics Austria. The present paper describes 
the main findings from this analysis.
The direct (monetary) effects of the replacement of unemployment assistance by 
minimum income benefit are analysed on three levels:
 – fiscal implications;
 – number of beneficiaries/receiving households, including socio-demographic 
characteristics;
 – income distribution and risk of poverty.
Current political discussions and developments in Austria are tending towards 
capping the sum of minimum standards within minimum income benefit with a 
maximum amount per household regardless of its size. This results in the follow-
ing simulation scenarios:
 – Scenario 1: basic scenario according to the minimum income benefit regula-
tions of the nine federal states for the year 2017;
 – Scenario 2: basic scenario including a proxy for an asset check of capital 
income, which is specified in the respective laws;
 – Scenario 3: basic scenario with a cap on the sum of minimum standards at 
EUR 1,500 per month and household including a proxy for an asset check of 
capital income.
2 sYsteMatIc fRaMeWoRK
Given that the qualifying period is fulfilled, the insurance-based unemployment 
benefit I (Arbeitslosengeld I) in Germany provides a replacement rate of 60 to 
67% of the previously earned income from work. The potential receiving period 
is three to 24 months (usually twelve months, older people 15-24 months). After 
expiration of unemployment benefit I, the social-assistance-type unemployment 
benefit II (Arbeitslosengeld II) is granted. It is composed of flat-rate amounts for 
subsistence plus housing support (where appropriate) (AK Wien, 2016; Bock-
Schappelwein et al., 2014; Bräuninger, Michaelis and Sode, 2013).
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482 In the Austrian system, unemployment benefit is also granted if the unemployed 
person has fulfilled the qualifying period. Again, the amount depends on the previ-
ously earned income (replacement rate of 55% with possible supplementary 
amounts). The potential receiving period is dependent on age and insurance his-
tory and ranges between 20 and 52 weeks (basically: 20-30 weeks; older people: 
39-52 weeks; after vocational rehabilitation up to 78 weeks).
Unemployment assistance is a means-tested insurance benefit, since the income of 
the spouse is taken into account. The basis for the calculation is also the previous 
income from work (92 or 95% of unemployment benefit). For the means-test of 
the income of the spouse, there are amounts of exemption, which are doubled or 
tripled for persons that become unemployed from the age of 50. Unemployment 
assistance is generally granted for a period of 52 weeks but may be annually 
reapplied for.
As in the case of unemployment benefit II in Germany, the previous income from 
work is not relevant for the calculation of the tax-financed minimum income ben-
efit. There are uniform needs-based standard rates (in 2017 usually EUR 844.46 
per month for single persons and single parents including a 25% basic amount for 
housing needs). In contrast to unemployment assistance, for eligibility for mini-
mum income benefit, a household’s own assets that exceed a certain amount of 
exemption are also relevant.
When unemployment assistance is received there is the possibility of marginal 
earnings (2017 up to EUR 425.70 per month). For the minimum income benefit, 
there are certain amounts of exemptions for employment income: in most of the 
federal states, an amount of 15% of the monthly net income is granted for a period 
of 18 months after a period of at least six months of minimum income benefit 
claim, with a lower limit of 7% and a ceiling of 17% of the standard rate for single 
persons. In Lower Austria and Upper Austria an employment entry bonus of up to 
one third of the monthly net income has recently been introduced (AK, 2017).
Since the minimum income benefit may also be obtained as a supplement to (low) 
other incomes, households with unemployment assistance beneficiaries with cor-
respondingly low previous household incomes have already been able to apply for 
it. In 2015 (providing the latest available figures), the average number of people 
receiving unemployment assistance per month amounted to 163,040 or 1.9% of 
the Austrian population. Among these there were, on average, 30,218 recipients 
(18.5%) whose household was additionally receiving minimum income benefit. 
The latter group would be little affected by a potential reform (AK Wien, 2016).
3 Data anD MetHoDs
The analysis is carried out using the tax-/benefit microsimulation models 
EUROMOD and SORESI for the policy year 2017 based on the latest EU-SILC 
2015 data (with incomes for 2014) for Austria with additional disaggregated 
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483income variables provided by Statistics Austria. The data was uprated to 2017 
with the use of empirical indicators.
EUROMOD is a tax-/benefit microsimulation model for the European Union, 
based on household micro-data from representative sources (mostly EU-SILC) 
and calculates disposable income for each household in the dataset (Sutherland 
and Figari, 2013). This calculation is made up of elements of income taken from 
the survey data (e.g. employee earnings) combined with components that are sim-
ulated by the model (taxes and benefits).
SORESI is an online tax-/benefit microsimulation tool for Austria based on 
EUROMOD (Fuchs and Gasior, 2014). It is further adapted to the effective out-
comes of the Austrian tax-/benefit system by additional income information being 
taken directly from the data for policies that are difficult to simulate due to miss-
ing information related to individual social insurance histories (e.g. in the case of 
unemployment benefits). However, as there have been significant policy changes 
since 2014, for this paper, apart from minimum income benefit, we also simulate 
social (insurance) contributions, income tax and family allowances.
The basic output from EUROMOD and SORESI is the micro-level change in 
household disposable income as a result of simulated reforms (in the concrete 
case: policy system with unemployment assistance vs. policy system with mini-
mum income benefit instead). The data output of EUROMOD and SORESI was 
analysed using the statistics programs Stata and SPSS.
The sample for the simulation of minimum income benefit contains all households 
in EU-SILC with at least one household member that is an unemployment assis-
tance beneficiary, who has received the benefit for at least one month.1 Unemploy-
ment assistance is set to zero. Subsequently, minimum income benefit is simulated 
instead, according to the specific regulations in the nine federal states and the com-
position and socio-demographic characteristics of the affected households. It is 
assumed that the regulations for unemployment benefit (for example, receiving pe-
riod, qualifying period) remain unchanged from the EU-SILC data collection 2015.
Within the simulation of minimum income benefit both means of subsistence and 
potential housing needs are simulated. For the latter, the basic amount for housing 
needs (included in the standard rates and usually 25% thereof) and potentially 
received housing allowances outside minimum income benefit are also taken into 
account. Incomes to be included in the means-test (implemented according to the 
nine federal state regulations) as well as actual housing costs are also taken from 
1 Unweighted, the persons/households with unemployment assistance relevant for the analysis are as follows: 
– households with unemployment assistance recipients: 361;
– unemployment assistance recipients: 381; 
– members in unemployment-assistance households: 895.
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484 the EU-SILC data and are offset with potential benefit amounts (see appendix for 
more details).
First, a basic scenario (S1) corresponding to the regulations for minimum income 
benefit in the nine federal states for the year 2017 is simulated.2 Own assets are 
also relevant for minimum income benefit. As there is no corresponding informa-
tion in the EU-SILC data, a proxy is applied in the basic scenario with an asset test 
(S2): test for capital income according to EU-SILC data, which, assuming a net 
interest rate of 1%, exceeds the amounts of exemption on assets (in 2017 in most 
federal states EUR 4,222.30 per household).3
Current political discussions and developments related to minimum income ben-
efit aim to cap minimum standards with a maximum amount per household 
regardless of its size. The upper limit also includes any supplementary housing 
need. In the federal state Lower Austria the sum of the minimum standards within 
a household is limited to EUR 1,500 per month. Even if other income is earned 
and this is topped up by minimum income benefit, the latter is only granted as long 
as the total net household income does not exceed EUR 1,500.4 Therefore, in 
Scenario 3 (S3) the sum of minimum standards (=total net household income) is 
capped at EUR 1,500 per month/household5 (plus including a proxy for an asset 
check of capital income as in S2).
We simulate only the first-round effect (without accounting for behavioural 
changes) and the direct outcomes related to fiscal costs and disposable household 
income of the reform. Indirect consequences such as, e.g. future lower pension 
entitlements, are not considered. Likewise, additional costs for society (e.g. 
regarding health, social participation) arising from an increased risk of poverty 
(cf. e.g. Lamei et al., 2017) are not taken into account.
2 However, in all federal states without ceiling for minimum standards, in order to make the differences with 
respect to Scenario 3 more visible.
3 The difference in estimated values for gross household incomes between national accounts and EU-SILC 
decreases from 10.8 to 3.6% if incomes from assets are not taken into account. This fact points to the under-
recording of incomes from assets in EU-SILC (Statistik Austria, 2016:51). Thus, the share of households 
passing the means-test for minimum income benefit in terms of capital income might be over-estimated, 
although we assume a relatively high interest rate for capital income. However, exclusion from entitlement 
to minimum income benefit in the case of home ownership (not reported here) showed similar results to the 
test for capital income.
4 In the federal state of Burgenland for example, also in which a ceiling was also introduced, the amount of 
the minimum income benefit (and not the total household income) is capped at EUR 1,500 per month. As 
this regulation shows only a minor additional impact compared to the basic scenario, it is not reported here.
5 The legal explanations justify the monthly ceiling of EUR 1,500 by arguing that the benefit income should 
not lead to a higher household income than one that would be received from an average employment income. 
For a household with minimum income benefit as single income source located in Vienna, the ceiling of EUR 
1,500 per month would roughly correspond to the minimum standards (incl. basic amount for housing, excl. 
additional housing allowance) of a couple plus one child.
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4854 ResUlts 
4.1  statUs QUo UneMPloYMent assIstance:  
eXPenDItURe anD benefIcIaRIes (-HoUseHolDs)
According to EU-SILC data (uprated to 2017), the following statistics are obtained 
for persons/households who have received unemployment assistance for at least 
one month in the reporting year:
 – 277,000 households (7.3% of all households in EU-SILC) with 296,000 ben-
eficiaries and 736,000 household members (3.5%/8.7% of all persons in 
EU-SILC); 
 – the average receiving duration (within the reporting year) is 6.6 months;
 – expenditure for unemployment assistance amounts to 1,454 million EUR 
(0.42% of GDP 2016 and 1.45% of total social expenditure 2015);
 – out of the 277,000 households, 56,000 households (20.2%) receive addi-
tional benefits to prevent social exclusion (minimum income benefit and/or 
social assistance), the expenditure amounts to 338 million EUR (0.1% of 
GDP 2016 and 0.34% of total social expenditure 2015);
 – in total, the 277,000 households receive 1,792 million EUR of unemploy-
ment assistance and benefitsaimedat preventing social exclusion (0.51% of 
GDP 2016 and 1.79% of total social expenditure 2015).
Men account for 59% of unemployment assistance recipients whereas they receive 
65% of expenditure, having on average higher average amounts than women. In 
unemployment-assistance households, 40% of the members are men, 37% are 
women and 23% are children (see table 1).6
Table 1
Unemployment assistance: recipients, members in households and total expenditure 
by women and men (and children)
Gender/ 
children
Unemployment 
assistance recipients
Members in 
unemployment-
assistance households
expenditures (related 
to unemployment 
assistance recipients)
in 1,000 in % in 1,000 in % in million € in %
Women 122  41.0 270  36.6   503  34.6
Men 175  59.0 296  40.2   951  65.4
Children – – 171  23.2 – –
Total 296 100.0 736 100.0 1,454 100.0
Source: Own analysis EU-SILC 2015 (uprated to 2017).
Related to household type, by far the largest share of unemployment assistance 
both according to number of households and according to expenditure, of about 
one third, is accounted for by single persons, followed by couples without chil-
dren (18 to 19%; see table 2).
6 Children are minors who live with at least one adult person in a household. Adult “children” are counted 
as women or men.
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486 Table 2
Unemployment assistance: receiving households and total expenditure by 
household type
Household type Households expenditure
in 1,000 in % in million € in %
Single persons  93 33.5 518 35.6
Couple without children  49 17.6 275 18.9
Other households w/o children*  31 11.2 131 9.0
Single parents  19 6.9 94 6.5
Couple, 1-2 children  39 14.0 179 12.3
Couple, 3+ children  16 5.9 102 7.0
Further households w children**  30 10.9 155 10.6
Total 277 100.0 1,454 100.0
* Households with more than two adults; ** households with more than two adults and at least 
one child.
Source: Own analysis EU-SILC 2015 (uprated to 2017).
In the unemployment-assistance households, approximately three quarter of the 
households receive (additional) income from work in the reporting year. The same 
is true with respect to (other) unemployment benefits. These are followed by ben-
efits for sickness and care (56%), family benefits (46%) and capital income (42%). 
Benefits to prevent social exclusion, pensions (incl. for work accidents) as well as 
housing allowances (outside benefits to prevent social exclusion) are drawn in 
about one fifth of the households each. 15% of households also receive mainte-
nance benefits as income. In turn, maintenance payments are provided by 12% of 
the affected households (see table 3).
Table 3
Unemployment-assistance   households:   (additional)   income   types   and   paid 
maintenance
Income types/ paid maintenance Households
absolute in 1,000 in % of all 277,000
Income from work 212 76.4
(Other) unemployment benefits 207 74.7
Sickness, care benefits 155 56.0
Family benefits 128 46.0
Capital income 117 42.2
Benefits to prevent social exclusion  56 20.2
Pensions (incl. for work accidents)  56 20.2
Housing benefits  53 19.1
Maintenance benefits  40 14.6
Income of children < 16 years  12  4.3
Education benefits  10  3.8
Maintenance payments  33 11.8
Source: Own analysis EU-SILC 2015 (uprated to 2017).
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4874.2  MInIMUM IncoMe benefIt-scenaRIos: eXPenDItURe anD RecIPIents 
(-HoUseHolDs)
The results for all households, for which we alternatively simulate minimum 
income benefit for at least one month instead of unemployment assistance, are 
presented below. Since the results for the three scenarios go in a similar direc-
tion as regards the duration of benefit receipt and socio-demographic character-
istics, corresponding results are only shown for the basic scenario without asset 
check (S1).7
In the basic scenario without asset check (S1), minimum income benefit is simu-
lated for 158,000 households (57% of original 277,000) with 348,000 members 
(47% of the original 736,000). The average duration of the simulated minimum 
income benefit receipt during the reporting year increases by 0.6 months to 7.2 
months.8 The simulated expenditure for minimum income benefit amounts to 
EUR 781 million (54% of the originally EUR 1,454 million for unemployment 
assistance). 
The proxy for the asset check (S2) further reduces the number of simulated 
recipient households to 131,000 (47%) and the sum of the simulated expenditures 
to EUR 670 million (46%).
Significant additional reductions in expenditure result from the capping scenario 
(S3),9 in which case reductions also affect the benefits preventing social exclusion 
from the data (for more details see appendix): only 93,000 households (34%) 
receive simulated minimum income benefit, simulated expenditure amounts to 
EUR 450 million (31%). Benefits preventing social exclusion from the EU-SILC 
data would still be received by 42,000 households (75% of the originally 56,000), 
with an expenditure of EUR 240 million (71% of the originally EUR 338 million). 
Together, the simulated minimum income benefits and/or the benefits preventing 
social exclusion are drawn by 108,000 former unemployment-assistance house-
holds (39%); the total expenditure amounts to EUR 690 million (39% of the orig-
inal EUR 1,792 million for unemployment assistance and benefits against social 
exclusion) in the reporting year (see table 4).
However, in all simulated scenarios, because of the abolishment of unemployment 
assistance there is a reduction in income tax revenue of about EUR 30 million.10
7 Results for other scenarios are available upon request.
8 At the level of the individual household, the number of simulated minimum income benefit months corre-
sponds to the number of original unemployment assistance months, since minimum income benefit can only 
be received alternatively for these months.
9 In 54% of those 153,000 unemployment-assistance households, which in the basic scenario with asset check 
(S2) receive simulated minimum income benefit and/or benefits against social exclusion from the SILC data, 
the average monthly total net household income is above the ceiling of EUR 1,500.
10 Unemployment assistance represents a non-taxable income but is taken into account for the determination 
of the average tax rate for taxable income.
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488 Table 4
Status quo (unemployment assistance) and simulated minimum income benefit-
scenarios: number of households and expenditure 
scenario Households 
in 1,000
expenditure in  
million eUR
status quo
Unemployment assistance (UA) 277 1,454
Benefits against social exclusion/data  56 338
Total 277 1,792
scenario 1: base without asset check
Minimum income benefit (MIB) simulated 158 781
Benefits against social exclusion/data  56 338
MIB simulated plus social exclusion/data  
(=MIB total)
179 1,119
Difference unemployment assistance minus  
MIB simulated -119 (-43%) -673 (-46%)
Difference UA + social exclusion/data minus  
MIB total  -98 (-35%) -673 (-38%)
scenario 2: base with asset check capital income
Minimum income benefit simulated 131 670
Benefits preventing social exclusion/data  56 338
MIB simulated plus social exclusion/data  
(=MIB total)
153 1,008
Difference unemployment assistance minus  
MIB simulated -146 (-53%) -784 (-54%)
Difference UA + social exclusion/data minus  
MIB total -124 (-45%) -784 (-44%)
scenario 3: ceiling 1,500 with asset check  
capital income
Minimum income benefit simulated  93 450
Benefits preventing social exclusion/data  42 240
MIB simulated plus social exclusion/data  
(=MIB total)
108 690
Difference unemployment assistance minus  
MIB simulated -184 (-66%) -1,004 (-69%)
Difference UA + social exclusion/data minus  
MIB total -169 (-61%) -1,102 (-61%)
Source: Own analysis with EUROMOD and SORESI.
For the analysis of sociodemographic characteristics, it shows that related to the 
original main recipients of unemployment assistance,11 there is a higher propor-
tion of men among recipients and that expenditure on them is proportionally 
higher (plus 5.5/3.0 percentage points) for the simulated minimum income benefit 
entitlement.
The proportion of children has risen by 5.5 percentage points compared to unem-
ployment assistance when looking at household members (see tables 1 and 5).
11 If there is more than one unemployment-assistance recipient per household, the person with the higher 
number of receiving months was defined as the main beneficiary.
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489Table 5
Simulated minimum income benefit (S1): recipients, household members and 
expenditure by women, men (and children)
Gender, 
children
original unemployment 
assistance main 
recipients
Members in simulated 
minimum income 
benefit-households
expenditure (related to 
original unemployment 
assistance main recipients)
in 1,000 in % in 1,000 in % in million € in %
Women  56  35.5 114 32.6 247  31.6
Men 102  64.5 134  38.6 534  68.4
Children – – 100  28.7 – –
Total 158 100.0 348 100.0 781 100.0
Source: Own analysis with EUROMOD and SORESI.
According to household type, simulated minimum income benefit compared to 
unemployment assistance for both number of households and expenditure shows 
a significantly higher proportion for single persons (plus 16.4/9.0 percentage 
points) and single parents (plus 2.7/3.7 percentage points). By trend these are 
household types with a smaller number of household members, in which there are 
no or only few possibilities of income provision by other persons than by the 
unemployment assistance recipient him/herself (see tables 2 and 6).
Table 6
Simulated minimum income benefit (S1): households (hh) and expenditure by 
household type
Household type Households expenditure
in 1,000 in % in million € in %
Single persons 79 49.9 348 44.6
Couple without children 21 13.6 139 17.8
Other hh w/o children 2 1.4 20 2.6
Single parents 15 9.6 80 10.2
Couple, 1-2 children 21 13.1 104 13.3
Couple, 3+ children 10 6.3 43 5.5
Other hh w children 9 6.0 48 6.1
Total 158 100.0 781 100.0
Source: Own analysis with EUROMOD and SORESI.
4.3  MInIMUM IncoMe benefIt-scenaRIos: IMPact on IncoMe 
DIstRIbUtIon anD RIsK of PoVeRtY 
Depending on the scenario, the replacement of unemployment assistance by 
minimum income benefit leads to a reduction in household income for 81 to 95% 
of all (736,000) household members in unemployment-assistance households. In 
the case of the 5% to 19% of household members where the household income is 
increased by the reform, a previous non-take-up of topping-up supplementary 
minimum income benefit should be the main reason.12
12 In the reform scenarios, 100% take-up of entitled minimum income benefit is assumed (see also appendix). 
Numerous research studies (for example, Hernanz et al., 2004; Matsaganis et al., 2013; for Austria: Fuchs, 
2009) prove that this is a simplifying assumption.
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490 The average loss of equivalised annual total household income per member in an 
unemployment-assistance household is 1,344 EUR in the basic scenario (S1) and 
increases in the capping scenario with asset check for capital income (S3) up to 
2,292 EUR. Compared to the mean equivalised income of members in unemploy-
ment-assistance households of 18,264 EUR before the reform, this would imply 
an average income reduction of 7.4% in the basic scenario (S1) and an average 
income reduction of 12.5% in the capping scenario (S3).13
In the basic scenario (S1) the number of people at risk of poverty14 is increased by 
86,000 persons, with asset check for capital income (S2) by a further 6,000, and 
in the capping scenario (S3) by a further 63,000, i.e. a total increase of 155,000 
persons at risk of poverty in S3. Correspondingly, the risk of poverty rate increases 
from 13% in the status quo to 14% in the basic scenario (S1) and to 15% in the 
other two scenarios (S2 and S3).
The poverty gap increases in the scenario with proxy for capital income (S2) as 
well as in the capping scenario (S3) from 19% to 20%, while in the basic scenario 
(S1) the indicator remains unchanged at 19%.
The Gini coefficient increases from 0.26 to 0.27 with the exception of the basic 
scenario (S1) (see table 7).
Table 7
Status quo (unemployment assistance) and simulated minimum income benefit-
scenarios: impact on income (inc.), income distribution and risk of poverty
scenario hh members 
w reduced 
inc. in % all
loss per 
capita-
inc./year
People at risk 
of poverty in 
1,000
at-risk-
of-poverty 
rate in %
Poverty 
gap in 
%
Gini
Status quo – – 1,137 13 19 0.26
Basic without 
asset check (S1)
80.8 -1,344 1,223 (+86) 14 19 0.26
Basic with asset 
check capital 
income (S2)
82.2 -1,536 1,229 (+92) 15 20 0.27
Ceiling 1,500 
with asset 
check capital 
income (S3)
95.3 -2,292  1,292 (+155) 15 20 0.27
Source: Own analysis with EUROMOD/SORESI.
Results by socio-demographic characteristics are again presented only for the 
basic scenario without asset check (S1) since the results for the other two scenar-
ios tend to go in a similar direction.
13 Compared to the mean equivalised income of all persons in EU-SILC (uprated to 2017 with policies 2017) 
before the reform of EUR 26,892, this would imply an average income reduction of 5.0%/8.5%.
14 60% of median income is used as threshold for risk of poverty.
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491The average loss of equivalized annual household income per member in an un-
employment-assistance household (all: 1,344 EUR) is the highest for men (1,630 
EUR), followed by women (1,283 EUR) and children (1,008 EUR). The house-
hold types with highest losses because of the reform are single persons (1,824 
EUR) and households with at least two adults without children (1,752 EUR).
Of the 86,000 persons that are additionally at risk of poverty because of the 
reform, 34,000 are men (40%), 27,000 women (31%) and 26,000 children (30%). 
Household types with the highest increase in absolute numbers are those with at 
least two adults without children (+19,000), households with at least two adults 
with three and more children as well as single persons (+18,000 each).
A reform would increase the at-risk-of-poverty rate of the total population from 13 
to 14%. It would increase most for children (from 16% to  18%). For women it 
would increase from 13 to 14% and for men from 12 to 13%. The household types 
facing the highest increase in the at-risk-of-poverty rate would be single parents 
(from 24 to 27%) and households with at least two adults with three and more 
children (from 23 to 26%) followed by single persons (from 23 to 25%).
5 conclUDInG ReMaRKs
If the Hartz-IV reform were to be transferred to Austria, this would imply that 
after expiration of unemployment benefit, instead of unemployment assistance as 
a means-tested insurance benefit, the social-assistance-type minimum income 
benefit would be the follow-up benefit. The analysis of the direct (monetary) 
effects of a corresponding application of the German model is carried out using 
the tax-/benefit microsimulation models EUROMOD and SORESI for the policy 
year 2017 based on the latest EU-SILC 2015 micro-data from Statistics Austria.
First, a basic scenario (S1) corresponding to the regulations for minimum income 
benefit in the nine federal states for the year 2017 is simulated without an asset 
check. However, for the entitlement to minimum income benefit, own assets are 
also relevant. As there is no relevant information in the EU-SILC data, a proxy is 
applied in the second scenario (S2): exclusion from entitlement to minimum 
income benefit where there is capital income, which, assuming a net interest rate 
of 1%, exceeds the stipulated amounts of exemption. Following the current politi-
cal discussions and developments, a third scenario (S3) with a capping of the 
monthly household income of households receiving minimum income benefit at 
EUR 1,500 is simulated for all federal states (including the proxy for asset check).
According to the EU-SILC data there are 277,000 households (7.3% of all house-
holds in EU-SILC) receiving unemployment assistance (for at least one month in 
the reporting year) with 736,000 household members. The total expenditure 
(uprated to 2017) for unemployment assistance amounts to 1,454 million EUR 
(0.42% of GDP 2016 and 1.45% of total social expenditure 2015). Out of the 
unemployment-assistance households, 56,000 households receive in addition 
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492 benefits aimed at preventing social exclusion of EUR 338 million. In sum, both 
benefits amount to 1,792 million EUR (0.51% of GDP 2016 and 1.79% of total 
social expenditure 2015).
The basic simulation scenario for minimum income benefit (S1) with still 158,000 
receiving households leads to a lower expenditure of 673 million EUR (-0.19% of 
GDP 2016 and -0.63% of total social expenditure 2015) in comparison to the 
status quo. The reduced expenditure increases by a further 111 million EUR (total 
-784 million EUR or -0.22% of GDP 2016 and -0.78% of total social expenditure 
2015) with the use of the proxy for capital income (S2; still 131,000 receiving 
households). Significant additional reductions result from the capping scenario 
(S3). In this case the benefits aimed at preventing social exclusion from the 
SILC-data are also affected by cuts: compared to the basic scenario with asset 
check, there is additional reduced expenditure of 318 million EUR (total -1,102 
million EUR or -0.32% of GDP 2016 and -1.10% of total social expenditure 
2015), with 93,000 households receiving simulated minimum income benefit and 
42,000 households receiving benefits preventing social exclusion from the 
SILC-data. However, in all scenarios, the revenue from income tax is reduced by 
about 30 million EUR (0.01% of GDP 2016) due to the abolishment of unemploy-
ment assistance.
Concerning the distribution of income and the risk of poverty, the replacement of 
unemployment assistance by minimum income benefit, depending on the scenario, 
leads to a reduction in household income for 81 to 95% of all household members 
in unemployment-assistance households. The average loss of equivalized annual 
total household income per household member in the basic scenario (S1) is around 
1,300 EUR and increases with the capping scenario with asset check (S3) to 
around 2,300 EUR. Compared to the mean equivalised annual income of members 
in unemployment-assistance households of 18,300 EUR before the reform, this 
would imply an average income reduction of 7.4% in the basic scenario (S1) and 
an average income reduction of 12.5% in the capping scenario (S3).15
The number of people at risk of poverty increases in the basic scenario (S1) by 
86,000 persons, with asset check (S2) by a further 6,000 and in the capping sce-
nario with asset check (S3) by a further 63,000, i.e. a total increase of 155,000 
persons at risk of poverty in S3. Correspondingly, the at-risk-of-poverty rate 
increases from 13% in the status quo to 14% in the basic scenario (S1) and to 15% 
in the other two scenarios. The Gini coefficient increases from 0.26 to 0.27 with 
the exception of the basic scenario (S1).
In sum, it can be concluded that the replacement of unemployment assistance by 
minimum income benefit on the one hand would lead to considerable reductions 
15 Compared to the mean equivalised income of all persons in EU-SILC (uprated to 2017 with policies 2017) 
before the reform of EUR 26,900, this would imply an average income reduction of 5.0%/8.5%.
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493in social expenditure. As there is more a strategic than a concrete interest in this 
hypothetical reform in Austria, it is not known how the potential resulting spend-
ing reduction would be allocated by the Federal Government and/or the govern-
ments of the federal states. On the other hand the reform would cause significant 
changes in income distribution and increases in risk of poverty. However, this 
purely monetary analysis fails to estimate the potential additional social costs 
resulting from an increase in poverty. Such an investigation is outside the scope of 
EUROMOD and SORESI.
Based on experiences in Germany (cf. e.g. Bäcker, Bosch and Weinkopf, 2011; 
Baethge-Kinsky, Bartelheimer and Wagner, 2010; Bräuninger, Michaelis and 
Sode, 2013; Brussig and Knuth, 2011; Dörre et al., 2013; Fitzenberger, 2009; 
Hassel and Schiller, 2010; Jacobi and Kluve, 2006; Klinger, Rothe and Weber, 
2013; Launov and Wälde, 2013; Schneider, 2006) it is difficult to judge the poten-
tial behavioural and labour-market-related outcomes of such a reform. Some 
argue that in Germany it increased the efficiency of the welfare system by shorten-
ing unemployment durations and that it contributes to the reduction of unemploy-
ment by increasing incentives for taking up employment especially for the long-
term unemployed.
However, others are of the opinion that measures for labour market support, per-
sonal services and job placement (Hartz I-III) were more important for the labour 
market integration of clients than the concrete benefit design (Hartz IV). Further-
more it is said that the “positive” employment effects of Hartz IV result more from 
a deterrent than from a supportive effect. Particularly, the job-seeking activities 
tends to intensify in particular just before the insurance-related unemployment 
benefit I expires.
In addition, the change to the new benefit (unemployment benefit II) was accom-
panied by a primary orientation towards a quick, but often not lasting, reduction 
of need for assistance. Also, the limits of activation became obvious: transition 
into unsubsidised employment is rare due to labour market shortage, especially 
for unemployed persons with multiple restrictions who are difficult to place. 
Furthermore, unemployment benefit II turned into an instrument of a means-tested 
wage top-up, which subsidises low wages.
In sum, experiences with the German Hartz-IV reform are mixed but also need 
further research for a final evaluation.
Disclosure statement 
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
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494 aPPenDIX
MInIMUM IncoMe benefIt ReGUlatIons of tHe feDeRal states (oVeRVIeW)
A person whose means of subsistence plus housing needs are not (sufficiently) 
secured by his/her own resources (income, assets) or prior social benefits (e.g. 
unemployment benefit, maintenance payments) is legally entitled to minimum 
income benefit. The right to permanent residence in Austria is another fundamen-
tal eligibility requirement.16
Minimum income benefit is provided by means of flat-rate cash benefits to secure 
subsistence costs and housing needs. The initial value for single persons and 
single parents is EUR 844.46 in 2017. The agreement between the federal govern-
ment and the federal states stipulates that the minimum standards for additional 
persons are certain percentages of this base:
 – 75% for adult persons living with other adult persons in a common house-
hold;
 – 50% for the third and subsequent entitled adult persons;
 – 18% for the first three minor children;
 – 15% for the fourth child and subsequent children.
The minimum standards are basically granted twelve times a year and include a 
basic amount of 25% for housing needs (in 2017 EUR 211.12 for single persons and 
single-parent households). If the appropriate housing needs cannnot be fully covered 
with these basic amounts, the federal states may provide additional benefits.
Based on the agreement, all federal states have passed minimum income decrees. 
The implementation shows a number of federal state-specific features.
Higher minimum standards
In Upper Austria, higher minimum standards apply than those laid down in the 
agreement between the federal government and the federal states. The included 
basic amount for housing is 18% (instead of the usual 25%).
special payments
In Vienna, persons who have reached the regular retirement age or who are clas-
sified as incapacitated also receive higher benefits by special payments. There are 
also special payments in Tyrol and – limited to minors – in Salzburg and Styria. 
In these three federal states, the special payments depend on the length of the 
minimum income receiving period (entitlement from three months receiving du-
ration onwards).17
16 It is assumed that there is no reason for exclusion from minimum income benefit with regard to the right to 
permanent residence in case of entitlement to the insurance benefit unemployment assistance (no correspond-
ing information is available in EU-SILC data).
17 For these federal states, given that other entitlement conditions are provided, special payments were sim-
ulated (aliquot) for those households, which show an unemployment assistance receiving period of three or 
more months in SILC. However, in the SILC data only the unemployment assistance months from the report-
ing year are shown but not any receiving months already dating from the previous year(s).
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495children’s standard rates
With the exception of Carinthia, all federal states grant higher minimum standards 
for minor children than is provided for in the federal government/federal states 
agreement:
 – Burgenland for all children 19.2%;
 – Lower Austria for all children 23%;
 – Upper Austria (based on the higher initial value) for the first three children 
23%, for all other 20%;
 – Salzburg for all children 21%;
 – Styria for the first four children 19% and for all other 23%;
 – Tyrol and Vorarlberg (in each case based on subsistence costs without hous-
ing costs) for all children 33% and 29%;
 – Vienna for all children 27%.
Housing need
Tyrol and Vorarlberg assume 75% of the initial value for means of subsistence and 
provide a more generous regulation for the housing need than the usual 25% share 
of basic housing need since the actual housing costs are covered to certain maxi-
mum limits. In Vienna and Styria, there is a legal right to additional benefits for 
housing. Salzburg also provides for additional benefits, without legal entitlement, 
and takes into account different regional housing costs, just like Styria. In Burgen-
land, in Carinthia, as well as in Lower- and Upper Austria, additional benefits for 
the purpose of covering housing needs (beyond the basic amount for housing) are 
on principle not granted. Differences in the minimum income benefit regulations 
also concern the extent to which general housing allowances (outside minimum 
income benefit) are taken into account in the means-test (only included in the 
means-test for housing need or also in the means-test for means of subsistence, 
etc.) and whether the basic amount for housing is reduced if housing costs are 
lower (cf. Pratscher, 2016).
overview on differences between federal states
Differences in the detailed regulations between the federal states (S: minimum 
income benefit laws and decrees; Armutskonferenz, 2012; Mundt/Amann, 2015) 
can be discerned mainly regarding the following issues:
 – types and amount of standard rates; with/without basic amount for housing; 
with/without special payments;
 – potential reduction of the basic amount for housing costs where there are no 
or lower housing costs;
 – additional benefits for housing needs provided by the federal states;
 – general housing allowances (outside minimum income benefit) only included 
in the means-test for housing needs or also in the means-test for means of 
subsistence, etc.;
 – (non-)including of other incomes in the means-test;
 – amounts of exemptions for income from work;
 – payment obligations (e.g. maintenance payments) to be taken into account;
 – accessibility of heating cost allowance for minimum income benefit recipi-
ents.
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496 As far as enabled by the information available in the EU-SILC data, the relevant 
regulations of the individual federal states were modeled for the simulation of 
minimum income benefit 1:1.
(aDDItIonal) coRRectIons MaDe In tHe sIlc Data  foR tHe sIMUlatIon of 
MInIMUM IncoMe benefIt
In addition to corrections of income data not or only partly counting in the means-
test for minimum income benefit, etc. (see above), for the unemployment assis-
tance months the following corrections were made in the SILC-data:
 – unemployment assistance: set to 0 because minimum income benefit is 
simulated instead;
 – unemployment benefit of unemployment assistance recipients: for unem-
ployment assistance months set to 0 since simultaneous receipt with unem-
ployment assistance (apart from overlaps) can be excluded;
 – further unemployment allowances (transitional allowance, education allow-
ances, etc.), expense allowance (e.g. for public employment service course 
attendance) of unemployment assistance recipients: set to 0 since as a rule, 
further unemployment benefits should be drawn up before or after unem-
ployment assistance. Expense allowances are also received in addition to 
unemployment assistance. However, if a corresponding expense allowance 
is also paid out to minimum income benefit recipients (and does not count as 
income in the means-test), it is a zero-sum game;
 – benefits preventing social exclusion: remain basically unchanged within the 
simulation of minimum income benefit for unemployment assistance months 
and are taken into account in the means test 1:1; these benefits are not 
affected by the proxy for the asset check since it is assumed that in reality a 
basic asset check has already been completed and that it continues to exist 
unchanged; as regards simulation Scenario 3 (capping), a correction of the 
simulated minimum income benefit with the EUR 1,500 exceeding amount 
of the total household income is first carried out, in case the simulated mini-
mum income benefit is reduced to 0 a corresponding correction of the benefit 
against social exclusion from the SILC-data is also made since the capping 
was newly introduced;
 – employment and self-employed income of unemployment assistance recipi-
ents within the unemployment assistance receiving period (entitlement to 
unemployment assistance is possible up to the marginal earnings threshold): 
the respective amounts of exemption for earnings within the minimum 
income benefit regulations were applied where there is unemployment as-
sistance receipt for at least six months;
A basic problem related to the income variables in the SILC-data is that income 
that is not received in all twelve calendar months is difficult to allocate to the 
individual calendar months. Apart from alternatively simulated minimum income 
benefit (on the basis of the number of unemployment assistance months) as well 
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497as other specifications for employment and self-employment income,18 basically 
all income from the data is included in the calculations as a year-twelfth.
analYsIs of costs anD RecIPIents (-HoUseHolDs)
As far as possible, the adjusted income data for the simulation of minimum income 
benefit apply for one (unemployment assistance) month each. Simulated mini-
mum income benefit (per month) is multiplied by the number of months of unem-
ployment assistance receipt. A comparison of original unemployment assistance 
and alternatively simulated minimum income benefit with regard to expenditure 
and recipients(-households) is carried out.
The evaluations are carried out exclusively on the basis of unemployment-assis-
tance households for the receiving months according to EU-SILC. Unweighted, 
the persons/households with unemployment assistance relevant for the analysis 
are as follows:
 – households with unemployment assistance recipients: 361;
 – unemployment assistance recipients: 381;
 – members in unemployment-assistance households: 895.
analYsIs of IMPact on IncoMe DIstRIbUtIon anD RIsK of PoVeRtY
Apart from unemployment assistance, simulated minimum income benefit and 
benefits against social exclusion (see above), all incomes are also included in their 
original form in the reform scenarios. That is, the further income corrections for 
the simulation of minimum income benefit (income not or only partly to be con-
sidered in the means-test, amounts of exemption for earnings, etc.) are reversed 
(the corresponding EU-SILC original data is used) as these incomes actually were 
accrued by the respective households.
The analyses are based on all persons in the EU-SILC-data on a yearly basis. For 
the calculations of the risk of poverty, the at-risk-of-poverty threshold from the 
original data is left unchanged (= fixed poverty line).
Unweighted, the total number of persons/households in EU-SILC 2015 is as 
follows:
 – households: 6,045;
 – persons: 13,213.
PotentIal non-taKe-UP of MInIMUM IncoMe benefIt
The simulation results are influenced to a certain extent by current (before the 
potential reform) and future (following the potential reform) non-take-up of mini-
mum income benefit:
18 Estimation of the receiving period for income from work on the basis of the following variables: employ-
ment status January-December, annual amount, number of receiving months for income from work, number 
of receiving months for unemployment assistance in the SILC data.
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498  – Current non-take-up of minimum income benefit: persons with unemploy-
ment assistance below the standard rates of minimum income benefit that 
would be entitled to a supplement: with the relatively low minimum income 
benefit amounts they are entitled to, it can be assumed that some unemploy-
ment-assistance households will abstain from application for supplementary 
minimum income benefit. However, with the abolition of unemployment 
assistance, the gap in income will be greater and thus the application for 
minimum income benefit is more likely. Since there are also households 
with income gains in all simulated minimum income benefit scenarios, it can 
be assumed that of the 277,000 unemployment-assistance households there 
are up to 20% of households that are entitled to supplementary minimum 
income benefit but do not apply for it.
 – Potential future non-take-up of minimum income benefit: especially in the 
case of households (or persons) that are only entitled to a relatively low 
supplementary minimum income benefit after the abolition of the unemploy-
ment assistance (due to other household income), it can be assumed that, in 
reality, there will be some non-take-up of minimum income benefit.
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